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Striking a balance between protecting 
commercial reputation and promoting 
competition 
W van ~ a e n e ~ e r n *  
Recent emphasis on the effect of the grant of intellectual property rights on 
competition has focused largely on "substantive" intellectual property rights 
(copyright, patents, designs), rather than on reputation (registered and 
unregistered marks, passing off). Arguably the nature and extent of rights in 
goodwill has a more direct and significant effect on the competitive 
operation of markets because established reputation is a formidable barrier 
to entry. In this light, the recent expansion of legal protection for trade marks 
should be closely scrutinised. It is important to maintain a productive 
balance between the legitimate ambitions of individual traders and the 
public interest in dynamic markets. 
INTRODUCTION 
A considerable amount of literature about the effects of patent, designs, and copyriqht "monopolies" 
on competition, innovation, and public welfare has been published in recent times. A key question 
that much of the literature addresses is whether and to what extent intellectual property rights form a 
bamer to entry in markets for goods or services, including research and development services. 
This literature addresses a question of fundamental importance to intellectual property law: how 
to strike a balance between exclusive rights and public access to knowledge, between limited 
exclusive rights and excessive market power. But is the overriding focus on copyright, patents, and 
design somewhat misdirected? After all, observing markets today as an ordinary consumer, one thing 
stands out: the power of brands. 
Ate we ignoring this power of brands, of trade marks, of rules protecting goodwill, and their 
effect on market access and competition?' Should not trade marks logically be the first target when it 
comes to analysing the effect of intellectual property rights on market dynamics? Trade marks are 
more directly concerned with markets than other forms of intellectual property. While copyrights, 
patents, and so on protect the efforts of authors irrespective of markets, there are really no trade mark 
rights without markets. Trade marks emanate from trading and commercial conduct, whereas other 
intellectual property rights flow from activities which are, or can be, totally unconnected to markets. 
In terms of the operation of markets, reputation is a powerful tool: reputation allows f m s  to 
diversify production and to raise prices. Established reputation operates as a significant barrier to 
entry and the reputation of a single product can be leveraged over all products of the fm. In terms of 
market power, reputation and goodwill are sometimes said to be the most cost-efficient barrier to the 
entry of rivals into a given market. This chimes in well with the ordinary experience of a potential 
new entrant; that which stands in the way is the consumer's knowledge of and adherence to already 
established brands. 
Associate Professor of Law, Bond University. 
See, eg Intellectual Property & Competition Review Committee (IPCRC), Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under 
the competition Principles Agreement (Final Report, 30 September 2000) <http://www.ipcr.gov.au>. Only about 17 pages of 
this Report are devoted to trade marks, and the general introduction to the relationship between intellectual property and 
competition makes no reference to goodwill protection at all. 
The focus in trade marks law has been on the question of parallel importation and exhaustion of rights, see Australia: IPCRC, 
n 1; Europe: Heide T, "Trade marks and Competition Law after Davidoff" [2003] 25 EIPR 4,163. 
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Recently, debate has arisen around the potential of goodwill protection, in particular trade mark 
registrations, to prolong the monopoly offered by patents or copyrights. For instance, some 
commentators are rightfully concerned that if works that have enjoyed copyright protection for life of 
the author plus 70 years (as yet not in Australia) are also able to be trade marked, this effectively 
extends the life of copyright to eternity.3 What of the bargain between author and society, which 
requires copyright to revert to the public domain once the copyright owner has enjoyed a limited 
period of monopolistic rights? 
This is a significant issue, but maybe it puts the cart before the horse. Rather than look at 
goodwill protection as a method by which rights in copyright and the like can effectively be extended, 
why not recognise that in fact market power of large corporations rests on established reputation, that 
is, recognition by the public? Copyrights and patents are then important as a form of limited 
protection for innovative products which potential new entrants can rely on to gain a foothold in a 
market which is otherwise foreclosed by the high barriers to entry of established reputations. They 
can compete with some chance of success under the protective umbrella of substantive intellectual 
property rights, at least if they have a product that consumers find new, innovative, useful, or 
interesting. In other words, substantive intellectual property rights are daggers aimed at the heart of 
brands that are well-known and well-established in a market. They are springboards by which new 
entrants can attract attention and establish their reputation in a market, and thus gain market share and 
compete effectively. 
Taking this approach further, one could say that the main impact and importance of substantive 
intellectual property rights is not to protect intellectual effort, but to enable new players to establish a 
competitive position in a market dominated by established consumer perceptions. Maybe this takes 
the point a little too far, but at the very least there is a complex and largely unexplored dynamic 
between innovation and reputation. Approaching the question of intellectual property rights and 
competition from this perspective draws greater attention to the importance of the rules protecting 
goodwill and reputation, to the efficient operation of markets. 
So to keep registered trade marks and related rights within clearly defined boundaries is of 
cardinal importance to competitiveness and to reducing barriers to market entry. Overly restricting 
market entry renders markets static, with consequent high prices, low estimation of consumer need, 
and emphasis on consumer capture and manipulation ( f m s  with established reputations will naturally 
advocate stronger goodwill protection). The rhetoric of fairness emanating from established trade 
mark owners demanding increased protection for goodwill, should therefore be balanced by a rhetoric 
emphasising market dynamics. 
INNOVATION AND REPUTATION FROM THE FIRM'S PERSPECTIVE 
Look at this question from the perspective of a f m ' s  strategic choices rather than from the 
perspective of public policy in relation to markets, barriers to entry, and competition. What is more 
attractive to the established firm - innovation or reputation? In the context of the evolution from a 
risk to a survival economy: investment in goodwill becomes more attractive. It acts as insurance 
against the risks and uncertainties of innovation. That is, both the high failure rate of investment in in- 
house research and development, and the risk of competitors' innovation unpredictably undermining a 
firm's market position. 
So, from an established firm's perspective, there are many advantages in investing in goodwill 
rather than in "substance"; reputation rather than innovation, even if the choices are not mutually 
exclusive. That is something that many f m s  have recently come to recognise more clearly.5 Think 
This is also an issue in relation to patents, where branding has been argued to artificially extend the life of the patent 
monopoly: see Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), s 25. 
That is, from an economy in which innovation is a calculated risk and an investment alternative (whether and how) to one 
where innovation is essential to survival and thus an investment imperative (when and how). 
Perversely this might explain the rise in patent grants going hand in hand with a reduction or stagnation in the spend on 
research and development, which has been observed in the US. Patents themselves take on a reputation or goodwill function, 
(2003) 77 AW 598 599 0 LA\IVBOOK CO. 
W van Caenegem 
again about the daily experience of a consumer; there is often little that distinguishes one firm's 
product line-up from that of another, or if there is, it does not last long. Most of the major brands of 
consumer goods sell virtually identical technologies. What distinguishes them is their image, 
reputation, style, appearance, promotional context and advertising feel. 
To put it differently, goodwill can be leveraged over any and every product the firm sells, 
enhancing differentiation and returns. There is thus a strong incentive for established f m s  to protect 
and enhance existing goodwill, both by commercial practices (ongoing advertising and promotion) 
and by lobbying for enhanced legal protection for existing brand-based reputations. Nftwork 
economic effects further enhance the incentive to invest in reputation rather than in innovation. 
Some other advantages that trade mark rights have over "substantive intellectual property rights" 
from the perspective of the fm: 
trade marks are flexible: any product within a relatively broad category can be sold under a brand 
name; 7 
trade marks can live forever, as long as minimal use is maintained and some other conditions are 
met;' 
trade mark coverage can more readily be expanded geographically, as brands can be instilled 
with universal appeal; 
the value of a trade mark increases rather than decreases over time, encouraging brand owners to 
invest more rather than less in the maintenance and policing of the relevant intellectual property 
rights, and to become more proactive;9 
trade marks mediate between producer and consumer: brands allow products to be coated with a 
veneer of suggestion; they enable so-called perception advertising, appealing to emotions rather 
than the consumer as rational maximiser. 
IS THERE "TROUBLE WITH TRADE MARKS"? 
Trade marks law does reflect a recognition that legal rights in goodwill or reputation act as barriers to 
entry. To give a single example, as a general rule, descriptive terms are not registrable as trade marks: 
others in the market or entering the market must be able to use such terms.'' Furthermore, trade marks 
law is a dynamic system: if a term becomes generic over time, that is, becomes the term by which all  
products of a certain kind are known, the trade mark owner may have to relinquish the exclusive right 
to use the term in relation to its goods alone. This prevents a genericised mark from acting as an 
unwarranted barrier to entry by prohibiting another supplier of the same roduct from referring to it 
by the name by which it has become generally known amongst consumers?' This dynamic interaction 
between proprietary terms and common language is a critical characteristic of trade marks law.'' 
they form part of the firm's goodwill rather than technological inventory: the firm is not particularly concerned with the 
substantive value of patents. Although I make a distinction between substance and goodwill intellectual property rights this 
indicates that that distinction does not rigidly run along the break-line of patents/copyrights/designs vs trade marks/passing 
off/unfair competition. 
See Lemley M and McGowan D, "Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects" (1998) 86 Calif L Rev 479. 
' The law now allows more goods to be covered by a single mark than was previously the case. I return below to the point that 
the expansion of the contents of classes of goods or services which can be covered by one trade mark registration is a major 
issue in the context of the effect of trade mark registrations on competition. Also the relatively recent change in the law which 
allows one application to nominate multiple classes of goods or services. 
One of the most significant legal issues in this context of trade marks and competition is the level of use required to maintain 
a valid trade mark. 
Hence the increased protection for famous marks, causing exponential growth in their value. 
lo This has recently come to the fore in shape mark cases, see eg Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks 
[2002] FCAFC 273 (28 August 2002); Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 
876 (30 June 2000). 
Naturally the combination of powerful brands with strong legal protection, and powerful product monopolies with legal 
protection will erect the greatest barriers to entry. Strikingly, in markets with a high level of consolidation the heaviest reliance 
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But even though trade marks law has always endeavoured to strike an acceptable balance, recent 
developments suggest that the balance has shifted dramatically. Reading contemporary case reports 
and observing legislative changes leaves one with the impression that there has been a considerable 
expansion and strengthening of rights over established trade marks and related rights both nationally 
and in global markets. 
So is there "trouble with trade marks"?13 It is difficult to argue that public welfare benefits by 
allowing a trader to misrepresent characteristics of its goods or services, including whether they are in 
some way connected with products of another trader. Some form of legal protection against 
misrepresentations of this sort is readily justifiable. How far such protection of common law marks 
should go is also a significant question, but the protection gained by actions such as passing off or 
breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) will never be as far-reaching as the statutory 
protection granted to registered trade marks. 
The legal rules protecting registered marks are not so readily justifiable. Why allow a trader to 
restrain others from using a mark where no consumer is actually misled by the use? Why allow a 
trader to restrain others (even if only for a limited period) from using a mark that the registered owner 
does not use? It is when we enter the realm of the more absolute property rights over signs, rather 
than simple protection against misrepresentation, that is, in the realm of registered trade marks law, 
that the "trouble with trademark" may begin. Because registered trade marks protection exists, there is 
a level of automatic acceptance of the extent of rights it provides; also, owners with vested interests 
obviously argue, sometimes cunningly, in favour of registered trade marks in general. Registered 
trade marks also have the magic of property rights about them. All this adds up to a hard-to-resist 
dynamic of growth in trade mark rights, and a modification of established legal principles and rules to 
that effect. 
Below I suggest a few ways in which this dynamic has arguably affected registered trade marks 
law recently. But a brief survey of some of the principal arguments advanced in favour of trade mark 
protection follows first. 
WHY GRANT LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MARKS? 
Consumer search cost reduction 
Certainly in the case of un-testable experience goods, that is, goods the consumer cannot test or try 
before purchase,'4 the mark or brand constitutes a shorthand message. To consumers, protected 
brands are signs indicating origin and, indirectly, certain qualities and characteristics of goods. If the 
law protects trade marks against imitation, the cost to consumers of ascertaining the qualities and 
characteristics of goods is reduced. 
To reduce search costs to the minimum trade marks must be simpler to search than the products 
themselves. Simple and striking marks rather than complex and indistinguishable marks will be the 
most efficient.15 This economic imperative results in many rules of trade marks law concerning 
distinctiveness and prohibition on confusing and similar marks. 
both on strong branding and on some substantive form of IP such as patents is found: for instance in the pharma sector. But 
legal product monopolies are always limited in time. 
l2 See the recent decision concerning the Sony Wallcrnan in the Austrian Supreme Court (January 2002; OGH 40b269101i 
29/1/2002 <http://www.ris.bka.gv.atljus> (the term "Walkman" was held to have entered common parlance as a descriptive 
term. 
l3 See Carter SL, "The Trouble with Trademark" (1990) 99 Yale IJ 759. 
14 The consumer is also more mobile so is more likely to be in situations where the consuming choice is not made on the basis 
of the experience of the product, for example, one would expect that petrol stations near motorways would be more likely to 
sell branded petrol than those found in communities where the consumer base is more stable; this seems to be the case: Png and 
Reitman, "Why are some products branded and others not?" (1995) 38 J of Law & Economics 207. 
Is Landes WM and Posner RA, "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective" (1987) 30 J of Law & Eco 265 at 269. 
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But the search cost argument cannot be the primary basis for a legal trade mark regime. The only 
reason that there is a search cost in the frrst place is that there are multiple providers supplying 
differentiated products to the market; and arguably the only reason that there are multiple suppliers 
providing actually differentiated goods is that legal protection of trade marks is available. In other 
words, a market for experience goods without trade mark protection would logically tend to be 
oligopolistic, if not monopolistic. In a monopolistic market the consumer requires no information 
because there is no informed choice to make. The more logical approach is therefore not to emphasise 
search cost reduction, but the quality differentiation (or product diversification) effect, as the primary 
basis for providing registration based proprietary rights in trade marks.16 The differentiation analysis 
is presented in more detail below. 
Information asymmetry 
To expand on the search cost reduction theory, trade mark protection can be placed in the broader 
framework of "information asymmetry" in markets. Information asymmetry comes about because of 
the unknowability of the qualities of many products - search, experience and credence goods. 
Producers know everything about their goods but consumers know little or nothing, which results in 
inefficient bargains. On the contrary, in a situation of perfect information, that is, where both 
consumer and producer know all the characteristics of the goods, welfare would be maximised by 
producers supplying maximum quality at minimum cost. But as product information is usually 
asymmetrical in origin, it is expensive to arrive at a situation of information symmetry: 
while better consumer information has advantages in terms of overall wellbeing, the cost [of supplying 
the information] is significant: a balance thus has to  be struck between the two.17 
Firms can take measures that go part-way to decreasing information asymmetry, private 
advertising being the most current. Governments can also take steps to increase information in cost- 
effective ways, for instance by setting quality standards or labelling requirements. If all products have 
to have the same qualities, then the consumer does not have to suffer search costs to determine 
whether a given product has the desired characteristic or not. Governments can also legally protect 
trade marks or brands as a sipficant informational tool, which is how trade mark registration 
increases economic efficiency.' 
Rather than giving information about goods as such through trade marks, firms provide 
information about the commercial origin of goods. That can be accompanied by explicit claims 
concerning the characteristics of the goods.1g The legal principle that trade marks indicate that the 
marked goods originate with the trade mark owner ("badge of origin" function) simply represents 
identification of origin as one step on the way to identification of quality and characteristics. Whereas 
%om this perspective, the real goal of trade marks law therefore is to find a balance so that the encouragement to enter a 
market and provide a consistent differentiated product is not outweighed by a search for rents without diversification based on 
perception advertising. If trade marks law encourages too many suppliers into the market, who see a chance of gaining a rent 
without actual product differentiation, this imposes an overall cost because of loss of economies of scale etc. But if, because of 
the absence of legal trade mark protection, there were no way for producers to identify goods as theirs, because they could not 
stop anybody from misleading consumers (and this affects trade marks law as well as passing off and the like), there would be 
only very limited numbers of suppliers in the market and the competition would revolve around price and availability. 
l7 OECD, Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries; Trade Directorate, Working Party on Agricultural Policies and 
Markets of the Committee for Agriculture Joint Working Party of the Committee for Agriculture and the Trade Committee, 
"Appellations of origin and geographical indications in member countries: economic and legal implications", 
COM/AGR/APM/I'D/wP(2000)15/FINAL, p 8. 
l8 See OECD, n 17, p 8. 
l9 The origin may be geographical rather than commercial, ie a product may be simply labelled "Made in ..." or it may be 
labelled as made in a place that has an established reputation for a certain quality (eg, Solingen or Sheffield for certain steel 
products). It may 6e labelled with a geographical term which has become a quality descriptor, eg, this wine is a Burgundy, or a 
Beaujolais, or this cheese is a Roquefort or this pullover is a Jersey or Guernsey! 
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the requirement of consistency of origin is a legal one, consistency of quality is motivated by 
commercial imperatives.20 
Quality differentiation 
Other economists stress that legally protecting trade marks against imitation is essential to ensure the 
supply of diversified goods. In the absence of legally protected trade marks supply would tend 
towards uniformity, and markets towards oligopoly. 
N S ~conornides~l postulates that without brands there would be no product diversification when 
products have unobservable differences in quality or variety. In the absence of legally enforceable 
trade marks producers have no incentive to produce goods above minimum cost, since higher quality 
which would command higher price and thus a greater return to producers cannot be consistently 
signalled to consumers. Competitors would copy the mark but not the quality and thus undercut the 
higher quality, higher cost producer.22 This holds true where the goods are experience goods, which 
arguably the majority of goods are in consumer mass-markets, where economies of scale dominate 
industrial organisation. 
The existence of legally exclusive trade marks acts as an incentive for producers to "produce 
products of desirable qualities even when these are not observable before purchase",23 and to produce 
those products with consistent and predictable quality.24 
Advertising and trade mark economics 
Advertising inserts an element of complexity into the equation. Whether or not the goods are 
experience goods, the mark encourages development and promotion of a perceived image. 
Now, advertising of a brand is useless without a trademark - anyone can imitate the product and profit 
from the advertising of the first maker. Thus the existence of a trademark makes advertising of 
perceived images possible.z 
In other words, instead of a consumer learning the qualities of a product from experiencing that 
product, and using the trade mark as a guarantee of repetition of that quality for future purchases, the 
consumer ''learns'' the qualities of a product from advertising. If that advertising is perception rather 
than information advertising then the consumer's adherence to the brand becomes less rational. The 
consumer is buying on the basis not of learned or experienced qualities but of perceived qualities, 
which do not necessarily reflect reality. 
A shift has occurred from the notional model of the consumer as rational maximiser, to that of 
the consumer as emotionally driven purchaser, manipulated rather than informed.26 From this 
perspective trade mark registration not so much enables higher returns from product differentiation, 
but higher returns from consumer manipulation. This secondary effect is one that trade marks law, 
20 Whether a trade mark is legally a badge of origin or of quality has nonetheless given rise to controversy, see, eg Davis J, 'To 
Protect or Serve? European trade mark law and the decline of the public interest" [2003] EIPR 180. 
Economides NS, "The Economics of Trademarks" (1988) 78 Trademark Reporter 523. 
" See Economides, n 21. 
23 Economides, n 21 at 526. 
24 Where the goods are not experience goods, the effect of marks observed from this perspective is less clear but it is said that 
the trade mark allows consumers to predict the quality of goods across a wider category in which they make frequent 
purchases, eg although a search buyer of washing machines, a consumer may be an experienced purchaser of white goods, or 
electrical goods. Thus it can make sense to have trade marks covering a wide variety of goods within some perceived broad 
category. 
Economides, n 21 at 532. 
In other words, in terms of consumers, the increase in cost will not be matched by a genuine increase in quality, or 
substantive choice; it is a dead hand on the economy, a negative economic effect. The product differentiation which allows 
limited monopoly pricing is then illusory. There is no necessary relationship between a diversifying trade mark and the 
characteristics of the trade marked product. In other words, trade marks allow a seller to create the illusion, through advertising, 
of a different product without necessarily creating a different product. It could be or remain the same as all other sellers' 
products. 
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with its prohibition against misleading marks, only partly alleviates. Perception advertising survives 
not on conscious deliberate misrepresentation, but subtle and subconscious association. 
If the trade mark's reputation rests on rational grounds, then there is a countervailing benefit in 
terms of quality differentiation and in terms of search cost minimisation. But if the preference is 
entirely irrational and built up by advertising that speaks only to the subconscious, in other words if 
only the image but not the goods themselves are differentiated, the advantage of protecting the mark 
is less clear. The only argument in favour of marks that do not in fact differentiate products, such as 
merchandising marks, is that consumer welfare is increased because the consumer pays for the 
product and the image (a holistic whole!), and values the combination highly enough to pay the extra 
price for the trade-marked good; the trade mark is intemalised with the product. But as well as being 
highly artificial, this ignores the irrational nature of consumers' responses to trade mark promotion.27 
TRADE MARKS AND COMPETITION 
Trade marks, costs, and barriers to entry 
In a market with no differentiation and perfect substitutability, there is perfect competition and 
maximum efficiency. To generate monopolistic returns, one choice the producer has is to differentiate 
the product. Trade marks are one way of differentiating a product and are thus a step back from 
perfect competition - they affect perfect substitutability. 
Thus trade marks have a price effect in that they allow the mark owner to derive some monopoly 
returns from differentiation. Consumers will still buy at a higher than marginal cost because they 
perceive the product to have differentiation characteristics which make it more desirable than lower 
priced substitutes. From this perspective trade marks impose a cost, both in terms of the owner's 
expenditure on advertising and maintenance, and in terms of price to consumers. 
But arguably protected trade marks make up for this increase in cost because of the greater 
quality of the underlying product, because they limit search costs over time and between products 
emanating from the same trade mark owner.28 They also prevent confusion and deception of 
consumers. 
Arguably the key in terms of barriers to entry is that trade marks make advertising ossible, 
which generates consumer loyalty and thus consumer resistance to new entrants. M H DavisB ves a 
lot of credence to E H Chamberlin's analysis in The Theory of Monopolistic Competition? and 
postulates that whatever the approach, trade marks are barriers to competition, not solely because of 
the language availability argument but because established preferences of consumers constitute a 
barrier to entry (it is easy to agree with Davis that the language availability argument is readily 
overstated). This can reduce competitive pressure on markets. It all depends on the size of the 
See Massey DS, "A Brief History of Human Society: the origin and role of emotion in social life" (2002) 67 American 
Sociological Rev 1 at 20: "emotional cognition precedes rational cognition in evolutionary time and in real time, and feedback 
between the two is such that emotional traffic into the rational brain dominates that going in the reverse direction." One 
important consequence, according to Massey, is that reaction to advertising, centred around brands, is to an important degree 
emotional. Through advertising, humans are conditioned to react in a certain way to the choice of purchasing a branded 
product: "Neoclassical economics assumes that tastes and preferences are given and that people enter markets to satisfy them 
though the rational process of utility maximization . .. Although professors of economics may accept these assumptions and use 
them to derive complicated behavioral models, their colleagues in business schools do not. On the contrary, professors of 
marketing for years have sought to teach students specifically how to influence preferences, tastes and motivations through 
advertising and public relations efforts. It has been years since the overlords of Madison Avenue have tried to appeal to our 
rational brains in marketing consumer products" (at 21). Massey goes on to ask what the rational connection is "between an 
entity labeled 'the Swedish bikini team' and a popular brand of beer?". He contends that the juxtaposition is quite obviously 
- - 
not meant to appeal to the rational brain. 
28 See Chamberlin EH, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, (Harvard UP, 1959) for a useful approach to the concept of 
differentiation and a handy connection between the differentiationlquality approach and the search cost approach. 
29 Davis MH, "Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A critical look at trademark use" (1985) 19 Georgia LR 233. 
30 Chamberlin, n 28, esp Ch IV. 
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deterrent caused by brand loyalty.31 If the deterrent is too great, social welfare will not be maximised 
and there will be a sub-optimal number of competitors in the market.32 The negative effects in terms 
of suppression of competition will outweigh the positive effects in terms of differentiation, search 
cost reduction etc. 
Differentiation as a barrier to entry in static and dynamic markets 
Economides also makes reference to the fact that trade marks act as a barrier to entry if they have an 
established reputation, that is, consumers will prefer the goods with known trade marks to those with 
the unknown trade marks of new entrants.33 The known-brand owner will be able to command a 
premium price for its product, and will be encouraged to increase quality to retain the reputation the 
owner has built and keep out competitors. But according to Economides, this leads to inefficiency 
caused by the legal protection, because at the same time competitors will be tempted to enter the 
market by the premium returns visibly enjoyed by the producer with an established reputation. 
Too many players will enter the market, which will result in loss of economies of scale. In other 
words there is a tendency toward proliferation of brands or trade marks. As long as the market 
remains dynamic, that is, there are constant new entrants who must discount the price of their goods 
considerably to compete with the established brand owners, the overall price effect for the market 
segment may be tempered (that is, the premium price for quality product is offset by the discounted 
price for new entrant goods). However, this is not the case if the market is mature or static. 
For legal policy, the goal is to strike a delicate balance in terms of the exact level of legal 
protection. For the seller, the question is whether the additional cost of differentiation is outweighed 
by the increased price which the product can command, that is, by increased returns. That includes the 
cost of producing a differentiated product, and the cost of advertising. 
Investment choices induced by brand protection 
The critical view of trade marks posits that they enhance the firm's ability to create illusory want. The 
resultant problem is that f m s  will be inclined to invest in promoting the image of the mark rather 
than in the quality of the product.34 Thus the promised benefit to the consumer and society as a whole 
does not necessarily come about. The trade mark may also hide the real characteristics of the product 
(which is saying the same thing); trade marks would assist in distorting competition away from 
concentration on price and quality. From this point of view, and here Davis again calls in aid 
Chamberlin, trade marks are a barrier to entry because they 
interfere with the ability of the consumer to judge new products - only because the assumed rational, 
intelligent choice of the consumer is a fiction.35 
Products that are really mutually substitutable are irrationally and artificially distinguished. Davis 
makes a valuable point when he says: 
31 AU the arguments considered above are premised on the symbol, be it a word or device, being without primary meaning to a 
consumer (the "Nike" model) rather than, as is often in fact the case with legally protected marks, the symbol containing some 
suggestion (eg "Mothercare") in relation to the goods or services in relation to which it is used. The beneficial market effects of 
trade mark protection are further undermined if there is utility derived from the symbol as such, ie, irrespective of the mental 
image created through advertising or promotion: "Most of the value of any trademark will be created with its identification 
with the product. Any advantage from the monopoly right of the use of the 'best' symbol can only be temporary and smd .  
This is true under the assumption that the trade marked name was not generic or descriptive, of the item sold. If the name were 
generic or descriptive, its protected exclusive use could create significant difficulties in the effective functioning of the 
market": Economides, n 21 at 538. In other words, the overall beneficial effect of the protection of trade marks is dependent on 
the trade marks not being required by other traders. 
32 This insight leads some economists to argue that advertising is the cheapest barrier to entq (cheaper than economies of scale, 
technological innovation, etc): see, eg Bain JS, Barriers to New Competition (Harvard UP, 1956), esp Ch IV. 
33 Economides, n 21 at 532ff. 
" See Davis, n 29 at 239. 
" Davis, n 29 at 240. 
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The conventional view assumes that trademark rights relate only to the use of the mark itself. The 
critical view recognises that far more is at stake, for domination of the mark in today's economy 
frequently leads to domination of the marketplace.36 
This intuitively rings true. 
LANGUAGE 
A struggle for power over language 
The phrase "domination of the mark" suggests that in essence trade marks law contains the rules that 
control a contest for domination over language. An alternative to a strict market economic analysis is 
to focus primarily on the role of language (in the broad sense, including all symbols) in markets, 
competition and communication in general. There is considerable consonance between the economics 
of language and many of the rules of trade marks law, which is very much concerned with preventing 
the monopolisation of signifying words and symbols. 
Monopolisation of existing language interrupts the information flow to consumers and disturbs 
the ability of a trader to communicate in relation to its goods. This cannot be a good thing, and as a 
result trade marks law tends to insist on symbols not having inherent significance in relation to the 
goods or services on which they appear. On the other hand it has to be recognised that terms of the 
language can acquire secondary meaning and that language is not static but dynamic. One of the 
things that makes it so is the dynamic addition of brands and trade marks to the stock of language: 
that is, brands become descriptors of products. 
Economics of language: trade marks as signifiers 
S L contends that even if marks do not have any significance before they are used (they do 
not say anything about origins or qualities of a product) - for example, because they are totally 
artificial - they can form an important barrier to entry, because it is clear, from the investments made 
by firms searching for new brand names, that some brands are more desirable than others. Carter 
argues that therefore there is a strong argument against allowing registration of marks that have not 
built up an actual reputation in the market (what he calls allowing "protection of marks devoid of 
market signifi~ance").~~ Carter maintains that it is a fallacy that marks have no value or significance 
or legal existence independent from the goodwill that they signify. In his view, in fact some marks 
without market significance or reputation are more valuable than others, and the more valuable they 
are the more they act as barriers to entry, or vice versa. Carter speaks of "market language": 
[it is] the language in which firms speak to consumers, and it consequently includes all the words and 
phrases that might be used to provide information about products and 
Marks are part of this language and when the law allows a mark to be monopolised a word is removed 
from the language. This imposes a cost which is cancelled out by the usefulness of the mark as an 
"information-economising" device.40 
Furthermore, if the mark has no meaning to consumers then search costs are increased if that 
mark is taken out of the available market language;41 in other words, if a mark without use, and thus 
without goodwill, is registered. From this perspective a trade mark registration is an incentive to do, 
to act, to use the mark created, not an incentive to create a mark in the first place; it thus has a 
different rationale than copyright or patents. The monopoly of concern to Carter is 
36 Davis, n 29 at 240. 
37 Carter, n 13. 
38 Carter, n 13 at 760. 
'' Carter, n 13 at 763. 
See Carter, n 13 at 763. 
41 See Carter, n 13 at 766. 
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not the monopoly or the "product differentiation" critique of trademark, which holds that firms will 
make socially wasteful investments in advertising to encourage consumers to make choices on grounds 
other than price among undifferentiated goods. [Rather] trademark protection matters because it allows 
a firm to remove a word form the market language, in the sense that it allows the fm to prevent others 
from using the word or anything confusingly similar to it. This creates what might be called language 
exclusivity.42 
This would not matter much if what Carter calls the "irrelevant mark assumption" always held true; 
that is, to use the quote from W M Landes and R A Posner that Carter uses: "A proper trademark is 
not a public good; it has social value only when used to designate a single brand". However, some 
trade marks are better and more desirable than others and thus cheaper to build goodwill around, so 
the irrelevancy of the precise form or appearance of the mark is not a correct assumption. In any case, 
firms tend to try to select marks that have some significance or descriptive quality, further reducing 
the available market language. Thus, the costs of later entrants are augmented and barriers to entry 
raised.43 
Besides, not only can suggestive marks sometimes be owned, so can descriptive marks. This 
makes sense because a stage may be reached where the secondary meaning is so strong that it is more 
cost effective, by lowering search costs, to allow one person to monopolise a mark, rather than to 
allow the confusion to continue of having various persons able to use what has become effectively a 
trade mark. 
The most significant conclusion from Carter's approach is that his arguments result in later 
entrants having to choose marks which are less effective and which will require a greater investme2 
in turning them into effective repositories of goodwill, thus significantly raising barriers to entry. 
The main point of Carter's argument is that "if IM [irrelevant mark] presents an accurate vision of the 
marketing world, then search cost economies will nearly always outweigh losses to the market 
language". But if some marks are better information economisers than others, "costs and benefits 
must be measured with more care".45 
Davis criticises Carter's emphasis on the importance of language simply by saying that the 
monopolisation of words is really not a big problem: "The monopolisation of a word can hardly 
compare to the monopolisation of an industry.'& If it holds true then according to Davis this analysis 
via language economics indicates that trade marks law has little negative impact on public welfare. 
Arguably this misses the point which is that the two may become co-extensive, and that Davis' 
dismissal of Carter's argument is only sustainable if trade marks law does not permit proprietary 
rights to extend too far into ordinary language. 
Language markets 
Landes and Posner take the economics of language seriously, referring to a market in language. The 
identify as a benefit of trade marks the investment in the creation of new words that it encourages. X 
This has advantages because language then becomes more efficient because the stock of names of 
things increases thus economising on information and communication costs. The stock of words to 
describe things also increases because many trade marks become generic descriptors rather than just 
product-specific terms. And they enrich the language "by creating words that people value for their 
intrinsic pleasingness as well as their information value".48 In terms of language economics Landes 
and Posner have few concerns about trade mark monopolies since the potential stock of new trade 
42 Carter, n 13 at 768-769. 
43 See Carter, n 13 at 771. 
" See Carter, n 13 at 772. 
45 Carter, n 13 at 775. 
" Davis, n 29 at 242 
47 See Landes and Posner, n 15 at 271ff. 
48 See Landes and Posner, n 15 at 271ff. 
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marks is infinite in their view. Carter would say, the stock of marks may be infinite but some marks 
are more desirable than others.49 
BUT WHY PROPERTY RIGHTS? 
All the arguments proffered above may support some right of action against misrepresentation or even 
misappropriation. They only partly answer the question why registration based, property style, a priori 
rights in registered trade marks are required. Some of the arguments referred to above even militate 
against certain crucial aspects of the registered trade mark system, such as the ability to own marks 
that do not have an established reputation. Additional arguments that address this question more 
specifically are required. Mostly these seem to revolve around specific reductions in transactions 
costs. 
Reducing transaction costs 
One approach is to focus on the importance of the register as a cost saving device. It is the reduction 
in costs to the trader, who is able to determine whether or not a mark is available for use, which is the 
most important reason for having a registration system rather than relying on passing off. From this 
perspective, it is not the reduction of search costs for consumers, but of rival traders that should be 
stressed. However, the ability to quickly and cheaply search registered trade marks does not obviate 
the need to also search and detect common law or unregistered marks, if a trader wishes to escape 
liability for misrepresentation, for which no intention is required to be shown. Nonetheless, 
registration does arguably promote competition by simplifying market entry of rivals. 
The proprietary system with registration also tends to limit transaction costs in terms of 
establishing both ownership rights and infringement. At least in certain categories of case, the 
plaintiff will not suffer the onerous burden of having to prove reputation and deception of consumers 
to obtain a remedy. Furthermore, clarity about ownership increases the ability to structure production 
rationally, by way of licensing of rights. Disputes concerning ownership in the context of transfers of 
business or goodwill will also be prevented to a greater degree. 
Other arguments 
Two further arguments must be central to justifying registered property rights: the anti-dilution and 
the window of opportunity argument. Dilution is damage caused to the reputation of a mark by 
association in the absence of misrepresentation or deception as to the true commercial origin of 
goods. It might occur where the defendant references a rival trade mark to promote its own mark. In 
other words, although the mark owner may not be able to prove diversion of custom, it may be that 
the future value of the mark is reduced because an unrelated party (a fortiori a competitor) has used 
the mark, for instance in association with an inferior product. This way of reasoning emphasises not 
so much the role of a trade mark as an indication of origin, but the fact that it is a valuable commodity 
in itself to which goodwill attaches as such. 
Helen f or man" points out that Shechter's seminal article in the Harvard Law Review which 
posited that a trade mark is not so much important as an indication of origin but "to create and retain 
custom", has little impact on judges in the United Kingdom, who continue to interpret the Trade 
Marks Acts narrowly without considering "what the proper basis for protection ought to be".51 From 
this point of view, the fact that the consumer is not necessarily misled by the rival use does not 
matter; the damage lies in the attenuation of the attractive power, the exclusivity of the mark. 
The window of opportunity argument posits that rational industrial organisation is aided by the 
ability of a trader to choose and protect a symbol for a period while developing business - hence a 
" See also Shuy R, Linguistic Battles in Trademark Disputes (Palgrave, 2002). 
50 Norman H, "Shechter's 'The rational basis of trade mark protection' Revisited" in Perspectives on IP, Vol 7, Trade Marks 
Retrospective (S&M, 2000). 
51 Norman, n 50, pp 191.192; see also Davis, n 20. 
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trade mark should be able to be owned and controlled even in the absence of a threat of 
misrepresentation - and a fortiori, reputation - otherwise the risk of wasteful investment is too great. 
For example, if fm X chooses trade mark XYZ for its new product, and invests in product 
development, design, promotional planning and advertising and the like, only to find that fm A can 
adopt the same mark with impunity any time before a sufficient reputation has been built up, this 
would result in an irrational interruption of investment in product development and marketing, with 
no overall benefit. As long as the window of property style protection is not too big (in term and in 
scope, that is, the mark has the potential to become distinctive) it serves a rational and efficient 
economic purpose encouraging the development of new products. 
TREND TOWARDS EXPANSION OF TRADE MARK RIGHTS 
It may be difficult to formulate strong conclusions from the often divergent strands of argument 
represented above. However, one thing is clear, and that is that trade marks do represent a potentially 
formidable barrier to entry which should not be underestimated. It is important to maintain a balance 
between the legitimate need for trade mark protection, and competition. Any growth of legal 
protection of trade marks beyond fairly narrow and carefully policed confines should be informed by 
a close analysis of its potential effect on the competitive balance in markets. Many arguments stack 
up quite firmly against having overly broad or overly strong legal protection of trade marks. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out above, there seems to be an opposing trend in trade marks law 
towards enabling the further entrenchment of market power on the basis of brands. Without any 
pretence at comprehensiveness, I list some of the areas of registered trade marks law, which arguably 
illustrate this trend. My identification of various areas of law is not exhaustive, and is at times more in 
the nature of a suggested line of inquiry. 
Signs that can be registered as trade marks: shapes and colours 
The expansion of the kinds of symbols that can be registered as marks, to include sounds, scents, 
colours as such, shapes and aspects of packaging has generated considerable comment and litigation 
in various jurisdictions. 
Registrations for scent marks have been rather limited, partly because of the difficulties 
experienced in meeting the requirement for graphic representation. The number of sound mark 
registrations is also limited. What elicits greater excitement and has greater implications in terms of 
competition and market access is the registrability of colours as such, aspects of packaging and of 
shapes. 
In terms of impact on the competitive balance, the question of registrability of the shape of goods 
themselves is maybe the most significant. In Australia, the cases have made it clear that the Trade 
Marks Act 1995 (Cth) is to be read as having effected a major change in the law.52 Whereas 
previously, shapes of goods themselves were not registrable, since a trade mark had to be something 
additional to the goods, that rule has now been abandoned in favour of treating the question purely on 
the basis of di~tinctiveness.~~ The implication of the legislative and judicial decisions is that the scope 
for extending monopoly over shapes through the use of trade mark registration is now greatly 
increased. 
52 See Hughes S, "Protection of Shape Marks in Australia: Extending the permanent monopoly" (2002) 49 IP Forum 49, 28. 
But Australia is just one example of a global trend: see eg the ECJ's decision in Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v 
Remington Consumer Products Ltd (ECJ Case C299-99,18 June 2002; [2003] Ch 159); see also the pending appeal to the ECJ 
in Mag Instruments v OHIM which concerns the registrability of the shape of a Maglite torch. 
53 In Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCAFC 273 (28 August 2002) on appeal it has been 
held that shape of the goods - marks applications relating to marks not yet in use will not necessarily fail for want of 
distinctiveness although it is difficult to distil from the decision any precise rules as to when the shape of goods can be 
registered and when not. The clear guidelines that the 1994 Act contained excluding certain shapes of goods from registration, 
and which were also to be found in certain foreign statutes, were unfortunately abandoned in the 1995 Act. This has resulted in 
rather a confused state of the law, in which the appeal decision in Kenman Kandy is the final word. 
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As to colours, the courts have recently handed down some decisions interpreting the provisions 
of the Act which allow for registration of colours per se: note the recent decision by Mansfield J 
concerning the tenacotta colour, Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCA 1 5 5 1 . ~ ~  
Again, extending trade mark rights over an area that previously was not amenable to registration has 
increased the potential for trade mark registrations to act as barriers to entry in certain cases.55 
Trade mark use requirement 
Others have convincingly argued that the requirement of trade mark use has been greatly watered 
down.56 
Although it may be desirable that a trade mark should be registrable on the basis of intended use 
in good faith, and that a trade mark should not be removed during a limited periods of non-use (for 
instance imposed by commercial or business requirements), a careful balance should be observed. A 
registration should not be able to function simply to deny other traders the use of a symbol that may 
be useful in their trade or bu~iness.~' 
As argued above, some marks are more valuable than others, because they have an inherent 
attraction or because they have a permissible element of suggestion. It is therefore not a trivial matter 
that they are not available for a longer than justifiable period. L Bently and R Burrell argue that the 
requirement of use is often set at such an artificial level, that it is too easy to satisfy and artificially 
maintain a monopoly over a sign.58 Keep in mind that these days this could apply, not only to word 
signs but also to shapes of goods, colours etc! 
Furthermore, the fact that intended use has been translated into actual used can only be tested 
after a relatively long term (see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), Art 16 (3)). 
Width of registrations for goods or services 
An important factor limiting the extent of the absolute rights of the trade mark owner is the principle 
of "specialty": the fact that trade mark rights are limited to goods or services specified in the 
application. Those goods or services specified are naturally supposed to be of a kind, or to have some 
close connection. 
The wider the category of goods or services that a trade mark owner is allowed to identify, the 
broader the owner's right may be. There has been a tendency which has given rise to concern in some 
quarters, to allow registrations for very wide categories of goods or services, in other words, for too 
many goods or services to be specified. 
This again has the effect of extending the monopoly rights of the trade marks owner.59 
Protection of well-known marks: expansion beyond the goods or services of 
the registration 
Provisions relating to famous marks,60 inspired by TRIPS, Art 16(2) and (3), mean that the rights of 
the owner of a well-known or famous mark in relation to goods on which the mark is not actually 
See also the Cadbury application where a colour mark was refused initially by the Registrar: Cadbury Ltd [2002] ATMO 56 
(28 June 2002). As to the situation in Europe, see Schulze C, "Registering colour trade marks in the EU" (2003) 25 EIPR 2,55. 
55 In fact concern is not limited to shapes and colours; absolutely anything is in theory able to be registered as a trade mark, eg 
the red and yellow M&M characters as portrayed in a video clip. 
56 See, eg Bently L and Burrell R, 'The requirement of trade mark use" (2002) AJPJ 18 1. 
" As to the question of what amounts to use for non-use assessment purposes, see eg South Australian Brewing Co Pty Ltd v 
Carlton & United Breweries Ltd [2001] FCA 902 (13 July 2001). 
58 See Bently and Burrell, n 56. 
59 See further, Willchon D, "Broad Trade Mark Specifications" (2002) 24 EIPR 228. 
For example Trade Marks Act I995 (Cth), s 120. 
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used have been expanded, even if a relatively heavy burden of proof is imposed on the trade mark 
owner. 
Note also that statutory provisions allow for a trade mark to be considered famous or well-known 
on the basis of promotion alone. 
Expansion of geographical scope of trade marks 
Even irrespective of the effect of the Madrid Protocol, the ability of trade mark proprietors to 
monopolise their marks in jurisdictions other than those where they are registered appears to have 
grown in recent times. 
Courts have been ready to accept sufficient reputation within a jurisdiction on a very narrow 
basis for the purpose of establishin6 proprietorship or ownership to determine who can legitimately 
apply for registration of the mark. This has gone hand in hand with a more liberal approach in 
passing off actions, which allows plaintiffs to bring an action even in the absence of local business 
activity.62 
Control of the trade mark owner over the authorised user 
Another important question is when authorised use or alleged authorised use actually amounts to 
relevant use for statutory purposes. 
Again there is an apparent relaxation in the requirements that need to be observed for the use of a 
mark by a non-owner to amount to sufficient use. All that is required in line with the cases from 
before the introduction of s 8 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) is that there be a "relevant 
connection in the course of trade". This seems in essence to mean that the owner or proprietor should 
have selected the licensee or user, and has some form of ongoing agreement, and little more.63 
Genericness: the "fault" requirement 
It has always been difficult to determine in what circumstances a trade mark owner should loose the 
exclusive right to use the mark because of genericness. Arguably trade mark owners should not 
automatically be the victims of their own success. There are two alternatives in Australia under the 
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth): 
first, that the registered owner cannot enforce trade mark rights from the date that the mark has 
become "generally accepted within the relevant trade as the sign that describes or is the name of 
an article, substance or service" (s 24(1)); and 
61 For a recent decision concerning this issue, see Renaud Cointreau v Cordon Bleu Int Ltee [2001] FCA 1170 (29 August 
2001); see also Winton Shire Council v Lomas [2002] FCA 288 (20 March 2002). 
62 See Conagra Inc v McCain Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 193 and subsequent cases. 
63 It does not seem to be required that there be actual quality or financial control provisions in the agreement between owner 
and authorised user: see Toddler Kindy Gymbaroo Pty Ltd v Gymboree Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 618 (12 May 2000); see also CA 
Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1539 (31 October 2000), although there arguably there was control: 
there was no express agreement but that a factual situation of control had arisen was sufficient. In Asia Television v Yau's 
Entertainment Pty Ltd [No 21 [2000] FCA 838 (22 June 2000), the fact that the alleged authorised user was furnished with the 
master tapes of videos and was entitled to reproduce them constituted sufficient control. In most of these kind of cases a 
passage is trotted out from Pioneer Kabushiki Kaisha v Registrar of Trade Marks (1977) 137 CLR 670 at 683 per Aickin J: 
'"These cases demonstrate that the essential requirement for the maintenance of the validity of a trade mark is that it must 
indicate a connection in the course of trade with the registered proprietor, even though the connection may be slight, such as 
selection or quality control or control of the user in the sense in which a parent company controls a subsidiary. Use by either 
the registered proprietor or a licensee (whether registered or otherwise) will protect the mark from attack on the ground of non- 
user, but it is essential both that the user maintains the connection of the registered proprietor with the goods and that the use of 
the mark does not become otherwise deceptive. Conversely registration of a registered user will not save the mark if there 
ceases to be the relevant connexion in the course of trade with the proprietor or the mark otherwise becomes deceptive." This 
passage does not set a high standard or level of control to begin with. 
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secondly, that a court on the application of a person aggrieved cancels the registration of a mark 
that has become generic under s 24 (s 87). 
In the latter case, if the "registered owner of the trade mark satisfies the court that the ground relied 
on by the applicant has not arisen through any act or fault of the registered owner", then the court can 
refuse to order the cancellation of the mark (s 89). 
Although this is a difficult area of the law, it seems to be the case that there are now fewer 
circumstances in which a trade mark owner will be blamed for the mark becoming generic, and thus 
being removed from the register, than was the case under the previous Act. This affects the dynamic 
nature of the system. 
Parallel importation 
Australian trade marks law does not grant trade mark owners the right to prevent grey imports, 
although there are some circumstances in which a trade mark owner can restrict such im ortation, as 
is also the case in some other jurisdictions where similar provisions may or may not exist. E 
Maybe unfortunately, the courts have countenanced ways in which trade mark owners have 
attempted to circumvent restrictions on parallel importation, by reversible assignments of trade 
marks: see Transport Tyre Sales Pty Ltd v Montana Tyres Rims and Tubes [I9991 FCA 329 (29 
March 1999). 
The introduction of "back door" parallel importation restrictions in trade marks law has 
potentially negative effects on prices and consumer access for trade marked goods, enhancing the 
monopoly position of the trade mark owner as it does. 
Other issues for investigation in relation to registered trade marks 
Some other areas deserve attention from a competition perspective, for instance: 
has the requirement of distinctiveness been watered down since the abolition of Pt A and Pt B 
marks, and if so, to what extent?65 
is there slippage in the determination whether goods are of a similar kind, thus allowing 
expansion of the right of action into kinds of goods that previously would not have been caught 
within the trade mark owner's net? 
to what extent has the onus of proof shifted too much onto the opponent in trade mark application 
proceedings?66 
CONCLUSIONS 
The trend towards expansion of exclusive rights in goodwill is concerning, given the fact that existing 
reputation is a considerable bamer to entry. Although the focus above has been on registered trade 
marks, there is arguably a discernable trend to protect goodwill more broadly by other legal means as 
well. For instance, it has been argued that trade mark owners have been too readily able to extend 
See in particular the current debate in Europe concerning parallel importation of trade marked goods, and some recent ECJ 
decisions on this question, eg Zino Davidoff v A&G Imports (case C-414199). 
@ The concern that distinctiveness requirements have been watered down too far also exists in other jurisdictions: see the Baby- 
Dry decision in Europe, as commented upon by Ian Kilby, "'Baby-Dry': A victory for the Ephemera of Advertising?" [2002] 
EPR 10,493. 
66 On the appeal in the Waltzing Matilda case (Winton Shire Council v Lomas [2002] FCA 288 (20 March 2002)) the 
respondent was successful, the court fmding that there was not sufficient prior use of the trade mark to defeat the ownership of 
the mark of the o r i m  applicant for registration. Concerning onus of proof in opposition, the court stated that an opponent 
may have to do more than raise a ground of opposition on the balance of probabilities, and has to establish that the relevant 
trade mark should clearly not be registered. 
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their power over the internet in relation to domain name registration.67 There has also been 
considerable growth across the globe in the protection afforded to geographical indications of origin. 
Furthermore, in terms of common law actions some courts have arguably been less concerned to hold 
the line between imitation as legitimate competition and the rights of established suppliers, or to 
adhere to the traditional insistence on distinctiveness as a precondition for success in passing off 
actions.68 
Whereas the anti-competitive and other deleterious effects of expansion of rights in copyright, 
patents, designs and allied rights have received great scrutiny and attracted concern, there has not 
been the same level of general debate in relation to goodwill and reputation. Specific areas have 
attracted attention, such as trade-marking of product shapes, but reflection on the impact of overall 
growth of monopolisation of signs by various legal means has been more mooted. Arguably, in terms 
of consumers' day-to-day experience and the realities of the market place, the steady enhancement of 
the power of established brands deserves greater attention. 
67 In British Telecommunications plc v One in a Million Ltd [I9991 1 WLR 903 the court readily found that the tort of passing 
off would lie even in the absence of any misrepresentation to the public, in a case where the domain names concerned were 
merely registered and not used. The registration of the name was held to be an instrument of fraud: any possible use that the 
registrant would make could only constitute a passing off (ignoring the fact that offering a domain name, such as 
marksandspencer.com to the owner of the trade mark Marks & Spencer could hardly be said to constitute passing off, and it 
was this that the defendant One in a Million intended to do). In terms of dispute resolution mechanisms, it is clear that the 
purpose of the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) is to protect trade mark owners on the internet, as is 
country-specific anticybersquatting legislation. But it has been argued that UDRP decisions too greatly favour trade mark 
owners, by way of a liberal interpretation of the bad faith requirement. Trade mark owners' rights have effectively been 
extended into the internet sphere without any careful considerations of the market and economic implications. An immediate 
effect of this extension is to bring the distribution of products via the internet largely within the control of the trade mark 
owner, potentially pre-empting the use of a trade mark as a domain name where the business of the website owner is to 
distribute the trade marked product. Note also the discussions concerning the rights of the owner of a famous trade mark to pre- 
empt registration of the mark as or in a domain name. As to arguments that the UDRP is stacked in favour of trade mark 
owners: see Gheist M, "Fair.com?: An examination of the allegations of systemic unfairness in the ICANN UDRP", as reported 
and critiqued in INTA Internet Committee, 6 May 2002: "The UDRP by all accounts works effectively: rebuttal, to analysis 
and conclusions of Professor Michael Gheist in "Fakcom?" and "Fundamentally Fakcom?'. , 
See, eg Architects Australia Pty Ltd tla Architects Australia v Witty Consultants Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 139 where 
Chesterman J applied the instrument of fraud analysis in a passing off case. The plaintiff was successful, even though the 
defendant operated the referencing website architectsaustraliacom.au, unaware of the existence of the plaintiff's business 
Architects Australia; he was not in competition with the plaintiff, the plaintiff had a very limited reputation, the name was 
clearly highly descriptive and it was accepted that there would be no real damage to the plaintiff resulting from the continued 
use of the website name. 
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